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Forums - Research / WW2 |
This WW2 forum is intended for asking and discussing reference or historical related issues pertaining to WW2 (1939-1945) subjects. |
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| Subject: | Re: I don't think so... |  |
| Date: | Dec 3, 2004 |
| From: | Alex Hill | |
I think this is very unfair on Monty, true, the master plan for Normandy didn't run perfectly, but then master plans never do. His skill (note Alamein etc) was in ensuring a strategic reserve and allocating resources to allow for the cock-ups.
''Can you imagine any commander, especially Monty, deliberately inviting the enemy's strength to face him (and thereby cause unnecessary suffering to his own men AND the postponement of his so-called "Master Plan"), just to make it easier for the Americans?''
Actually this is exactly what did happen, but not because of any nationalistic predjudice or pride The reasoning behind the Commonwealth troops taking the northern sector wasn't about favouring the British or Americans, it was planned that way so that the strongest area of German defence would be attacked by the most experienced troops, like the 50th and (Montys' favourite) 3rd Inf Divs. This made him extremely unpopular with the rank and file (contrary to period propaganda) because they felt that they'd already been doing their fair share since 1939 and the bleak predictions about D-day losses didn't bode well for troops who'd been lucky enough to dodge German bullets since the days of the B.E.F.
Of course Montys' original 'thin crust' theory of the German defences was wrong, but having been proved wrong the infrastructure was in place for a switch to his more familiar desert tactic of the 'crumbling process', which through the race course series of offensives did draw and subsequently destroy, enough of the German strength to allow Cobra to suceed. Whether the intention was to break out at Caen or to draw the Germans into the open is a moot point. The effect was much the same. Could any Commander have handled the breakout better? Probably not. With the Allies contained on the beach head the nature of the fight was dictated more by the Germans defences than Allied stratedy.
A final word on Arnhem- undoubtably a tragic balls up, but if it had come off (and it so nearly did) the war would have ended in 1944 saving thousands of lives and preventing a Soviet occupation of large chunks of eastern Europe. Was it a risk worth taking? Probably.
Al |
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